State Constitutional Conventions and State Legislative Power by Dodd, Walter F.
Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 2 | Issue 1 Article 2
12-1-1948
State Constitutional Conventions and State
Legislative Power
Walter F. Dodd
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by
an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Walter F. Dodd, State Constitutional Conventions and State Legislative Power, 2 Vanderbilt Law Review 27 (1948)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol2/iss1/2
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS
AND STATE LEGISLATIVE POWER
WALTER F. DODD *
The State of Tennessee faces a serious problem in that it badly needs
changes in its Constitution of 1870 and finds it substantially impossible to
make such changes by means of proposed amendments by the two houses of
its General Assembly. The requirements (1) that legislative proposal be by a
majority of all members of the two houses and that it be agreed to by two
thirds of the General Assembly then next chosen, and (2) that approval of a
proposed amendment be "by a majority of all the citizens of the State, voting
for Representatives," ' substantially defeat possibility of change, as has been
found with respect tb such requirements in other states. The further require-
ment that amendments are not to be proposed oftener than once in six years
materially restricts legislative proposals, and such proposal if made has little
chance of adoption. In the State of Tennessee there appears to be no possi-
bility that the General Assembly should submit a revised constitution to
popular vote as was done in the State of Georgia in 1945.
It is necessary, therefore, if needed changes are to be made by a revision
of the constitution, that use be made of the constitutional provision that:
"The legislature shall have the right, at any time, by law, to submit to the people
the question of calling a convention to alter, reform or abolish this constitution, and
when, upon such submission, a majority of all the votes cast shall be in favor of said
proposition, then 'delegates shall be chosen, and the convention shall assemble in such
mode and manner As shall be prescribed." 2
A Constitutional Revision Commission was appointed by the Governor
on authority of a joint resolution of the General Assembly. As a result of a
thorough study of the situation, the Commission has recommended that the
legislature submit to popular vote the question of calling a constitutional con-
vention with authority to revise only as to (1) amendments and convehtions;
(2) taxation; (3) apportionment of senators and representatives; (4) legisla-
tive quorum; (5) compensation of legislators; (6) governor's term; (7)
governor's veto power; (8) suffrage; (9) municipal home rule and city-
county consolidations. 3 On the basis of its studies, the Commission has made
* Of Dodd & Edmunds, Chicago, Illinois. Author, REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF
STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1910), STATE GOVERNMENT (2d ed. 1928), ADMINISTRATION
OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (1936) and other legal treatises; editor, CASES ON CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1941) ; Professor of Law, Yale University, 1927-30.
1. Art XI, § 3.
2. Ibid.
3. REPORT OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION COMMISSION (1946) ("The Frierson
Report").
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
specific recommendations as to each topic, but does not seek to bind a con-
stitutional convention to its specific recommendations, except as to the limita-
tion to the designated topics.
The Commission reported that
"Our first conclusion is that a general revision or a new Constitution is not needed,
would be unwise, and, in all probability, would be rejected at the polls.""
The Commission also said that "an unlimited convention is not needed and
probably would be rejected." 5
If the Commission's proposal should be adopted, the holding of a con-
vention would require: (1) the submission to the people by the Legislature of
the question of calling a convention "to alter, reform or abolish" the existing
constitution only as to the nine specified topics; and (2) a popular vote in
favor of a constitutional convention so limited.
If the legislature has authority to submit the question as to a convention
with limited powers, such question is subject to approval or disapproval by
the popular vote; and by virtue of such legislative and popular action a control-
ling instruction is given to the constitutional convention. The questions of
law are (1) whether the legislature can submit the limited issue to popular
vote, and (2) whether the limited authority is imposed upon the constitutional
convention by a favorable popular vote.
The Constitution Revision Commission takes the position that such
power is vested in the legislature. The Attorney General of the State takes an
opposing view. 6 With respect to his opinion, two questions were submitted to
the Attorney General: (1) as indicated above, whether the legislature can
submit the question of a constitutional convention with limited authority to
propose amendments and (2) whether the constitutional convention would be
so limited by legislative action approved by popular vote. Obviously the legis-
lative and popular action would not be controlling if they did not restrict the
constitutional convention.
Decisions of courts of the several states bear upon this problem, but thatI
of each state must be construed with respect to the constitutional provisions
of that state.
In the construction of state and federal constitutions, it has long been
established that, "The federal constitution confers powers particularly enum-
erated; that of the state contains a general grant of all powers not excepted." 7
Theoretically, state powers are original powers, vested in the state legislature,
4. Id. at 3.
5. Id. at 5.
6. Opinion of Attorney General to Constitutional Revision Commission, May 16,
1946 (Published in pamphlet form under title "Right of the Legislature to Call a
Limited Constitutional Convention").
.7. Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147, 160 (1853).
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and subject only to such limitations as appear in the state constitutional texts.
Although no principle of constitutional construction is strictly adhered to,
each case with reference to state constitutional conventions must be considered
with reference to constitutional provisions or the absence thereof in the
respective states.
The legislative power, in the absence- of restriction, is well stated as to
conventions, in the case of Erwin v. Nolan: 8
S.. the claim as to the superior power of this convention over that of the Legis-
lature is a mere flourish of words, and will not stand the test of analysis. The Legis-
lature, within its own province, as defined by law, is supreme. To no greater extent
is a convention, which, like the Legislature, must derive its power from the law. That
the convention derived its power from the people is true, but the power thus conferred
was limited by the people themselves to the terms of the legislative enactment under
which the members of the convention were elected. If this limitation, or some other
which defined the purpose of the act, had not been embodied therein, no reason would
have been presented for requiring the people to vote upon the selection of delegates to
th6 convention. In the absence, therefore, of this 6r some other prescribed purpose,
the act would not only have been futile, but absurd."
The present problem relates only to the extent to which the scope of
action by a constitutional convention in proposing constitutional changes may
be restricted by legislative action approved by popular vote. The power of the
legislature to propose such restrictions to the people depends upon the extent
to which the state constitution restricts the action of the state legislature. In
this connection state constitutions may be classified into several groups:
(1) Some state constitutions contain no provisions for constitutional
conventions; 9 and two provide for constitutional conventions without re-
quiring a popular .vote upon whether such a convention shall be held. 10
(2) Several states provide for periodical submission to popular vote of
the question of holding a convention; 11 and three of these prescribe in detail
the powers and duties of the convention.' 2
(3) The other state constitutions require a popular expression of approval
to be obtained by the state legislative body in order to hold a constitutional
convention.
In all of the states whose constitutions make no provision for constitu-
tional conventions, it has been substantially recognized since In re Opinion
to the Governor,'3 that such conventions may be assembled by legislative act,
and that the proposal for such a convention should preferably receive popular
8. 280 Mo. 401, 217 S. W. 837, 840 (1920).
9. Ark., Conn., Ind., La., Mass., Miss., N. J., N. D., Pa., R. I., Tex., Vt.
10. Ga., Me.
11. Ia., Md., Mich., Mo., N. Y., N. H., Ohio.
12. Mich., Mo., N. Y.
13. 55 R. I. 56, 178 Atl. 433 (1935).
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approval. The power, however, is legislative, and the power to provide for a
popular vote upon the holding of a convention when it is not required by a
constitution exists because of lack of prohibition by the state constitution.
The legislative power to take steps for a convention and to provide a popular
vote upon whether it shall be assembled is, in the states where such power has
been neither granted nor denied, a general grant of legislative power through
the omission of either specific grant or prohibition. And in a state where a
power exists in the legislature because not denied, this power is exercised by
the legislature when it specifies the conditions under which there may be a
popular expression of opinion; and a popular approval becomes a part of the
legislative action.
That the limitations imposed by the legislature and approved by popular
vote are controlling is definitely determined by the opinions of courts of states
whose constitutions do not provide for constitutional conventions.
Massachusetts is one of the states whose constitution does not provide for
constitutional conventions. The Opinion of Justices,14 involved an inquiry as
to whether a constitutional convention could propose other amendments to the
people if the legislature should pass a law limited to specific parts, and should
have the approval of such law by a majority of the people. The court said that
the convention would derive its whole authority from the vote of the people
and that "upon the general principles governing the delegation of power and
authority, they would have no right, under such vote, to act upon and propose
amendments in other parts of the constitution not so specified." 15
Rhode Island is another state whose constitution does not provide for
constitutional conventions. In Re Opinion to the Governor,16 the court said:
"If, at the time the question of calling the convention is submitted to them, the
people are informed of the scope of the convention and the manner in which it is to
conduct its deliberations, and report its results by virtue of the act of the General
Assembly specifying such matters, then a convention called in this manner will be limited
as therein set forth and the convention will then be bound to confine itself within the
stated limits of the act of the Assembly."
A similar view has been taken in Louisiana, whose constitution also makes no
provision for a constitutional convention. In State v. Jones,17 the court said
that with the exception of three specified matters "the power of the convention
to frame and adopt a new Constitution was as full as could be conveyed by the
Legislature and the people of the state."
The Pennsylvania constitution makes no provision for a constitutional
14. 6 Cush. 573 (Mass. 1833).
15. Id. at 575.
16. 55 R. I. 56, 99, 178 Atl. 433, 452 (1935).
17. 151 La. 714, 92 So. 310 (1922).
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convention, and, with respect to a convention provided by statute with
popular approval, the court said, in Wells v. Bain: 18
"This law, being unrepealed, and being acted upon by the people, became their
own delegation of authority-the chart of the delegates to guide and control them in
the duties they were elected to perform as thq servants of the people. Without this
legislation the convention had not existed; and to exist on terms not found in or con-
trary to the law is to seek for a grant of powers to be found nowhere else, ,except in
a state of revolution." I
The constitution of New Jersey makes no provision for a constitutional
convention, and has not in this respect been construed by the courts of that
state, but the recent experience of that state is of importance because of its
relation to the present problem in Tennessee. The New Jersey legislature
passed an act "to provide for a state constitutional convention so instructed
by the legal voters that it shall have no power to propose any change in the
present basis of representation in the legislature," or make "change in the
present territorial limits of the respective counties." This act was approved by
popular vote; delegates to the convention were elected at the same time; the
convention proposed a new constitution without change in boundaries of
counties or in legislative representation; the new constitution was submitted
to popular vote and adopted in 1947.
The cases referred to above arose in states whose constitutions contain
no provisions as to constitutional conventions. Such 'constitutional provisions
with respect thereto as exist in other state constitutions are, of course, restric-
tive upon the state legislatures. As previously indicated, the constitutions of
Michigan, Missouri (1945) and New York not only provide for periodical
popular votes upon the holding of conventions, independently of legislative
action, but also make detailed provisions regarding the choice and procedure
of delegates.
The internal procedure of a convention has properly been regarded as
within the convention's power, independently of constitutional provisions. This
was announced in the New York convention of 1894 and the Michigan
convention of 1908; and is the basis of decision in Goodrich v. Moore.19 The
majority opinion in Carton v. Secretary of State,20 merely denied a legislative
power to control the day of submission of the convention's work, when the
convention had been unable to complete its work.
The power of a legislature to submit to popular vote the question of
having a constitutional convention with restricted powers, and the power of
legal voters to approve such a convention, exist unless forbidden by the
constitution itself. A constitutional provision without such prohibitions brings
18. 75 Pa. 39, 52 (1873).
19. 2 Minn. 61 (1858).
20. 151 Mich. 337, 115 N. W. 429 (1908).
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this issue to the same basis as if there were no constitutional provision for a
convention; and attention has already been called to the fact that decisions in
states whose constitutions make no provisions for conventions support the
view that restrictions may be imposed upon the topics to be considered, if
such restrictions are submitted by the legislature and approved by popular vote.
The issue is therefore one of construction of the last sentence of Article
XI, section 3, of the constitution of Tennessee. That sentence is here repeated
and reads as follows:
"The legislature shall have the right, at any time, by law to submit to the people
the question of calling a convention to alter, reform or abolish this Constitution; and
when upon such submission, a majority of all the votes cast shall be in favor of said
proposition, then delegates shall be chosen, and the convention shall assemble in such
mode and manner as shall be prescribed."
Does this grant to the legislature a power which Would not otherwise exist;
and does it limit the submission by the legislature to the voters so as to require
that the voters may express theinselves for or against a constitutional conven-
tion only if the convention is to have authority in its own judgment to propose
changes in any or all parts of the constitution?
The only judicial determination of an issue parallel to this is that of the
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in the case of Staples v. Gilner.2' Section
197 of the constitution of Virginia provides that a majority of the members
elected to each house may submit to the electors the question "shall there be
a convention to revise the Constitution and amend the same?" By an act, the
Virginia General Assembly proposed to submit the above question to the
electors, with the added provision that, if a constitutional convention were
approved, the delegation of power to a convention by the people should be
limited to constitutional amendments regarding the right to vote "by members
of the armed forces while in active service in time of war."
The act providing for a popular vote upon the holding of a convention for
this limited purpose was, with one dissent, sustained by the Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals, which made the following statement:
"If the electors vote in favor of a convention, it may amend the Constitution as
well as revise it, and where the legislature, in the performance of its representative
function, asks the electors if they desire a convention to amend or revise a certain
part of the Constitution but not the whole Constitution, an affirmative vote of the
people on such question would have the binding effect of the people themselves limiting
the scope of the convention to the very portion of the Constitution suggested to them
by the legislature. The wishes of the people are supreme. Some agency must ascertain
the desire of the people, and the legislature, by section 197, has been selected by them
to do so." '2
21. 183 Va. 613, 33 S. E. 2d 49, 158 A. L. R. 495 (1945). See the excellent annota-
tion to this case in 158 A. L. R. 512 (1945).
22. 183 Va. at 627, 33 S. E. 2d at 55, 158 A. L. R. at 503.
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With respect to the power of the legislature to ascertain the desire of the
people regarding the scope of powers of a proposed constitutional convention,
the language of the constitution of Tennessee is broader than that of the
constitution of Virginia. Under the Virginia language the question to be
submitted is specified as "to revise the constitution and amend the same," and
a strict construction may require a complete power to revise, although this was
not required. The language of the Tennessee constitution leaves the form of
submission to the legislature, and specifically authorizes that it may be in an
alternative of "alter, reform or abolish." The form of the question is not
specified.
As heretofore indicated, decisions by the courts of states with.respect to
the powers of constitutional conventions must be considered in connection
with the differences of issue in the several states. Such differences naturally
depend upon differences in the language of constitutions with respect to
constitutional conventions. In addition, the function of a constitutional con-
vention gives it control over its proceedings and over the character of its
recommendations within the field of its authority. This is expressed in an
early Minnesota case. 23
In Carton v. Secretary of State,24 the Supreme Court of Michigan said:
"In this State the Constitution is the charter of the convention and its sole
charter." This is a statement of fact with respect to the then-existing constitu-
tion of Michigan, and was opposed by three members of the court.
The position that the state constitution is the sole charter of a constitu-
tional convention would clearly apply to a convention assembled in New York
upon the basis of a vote each twenty years upon having a convention, without
action by the legislature, and with a constitutional provision as to every detail
of organization and procedure. Although the New York legislature may also
submit the question of holding conventions at such times as it may by law
provide, a convention assembled in either manner is governed by the constitu-
tion, and its proposals are submitted "to a vote of the electors of the state at
the time and in the manner provided by such convention." 25
But in states whose constitutions have no provision for a convention but
which normally call conventions upon a popular approval of a legislative
proposal, and in those which, like Tennessee, merely provide in their consti-
tutions that a legislature obtain the approval of the voters of the State, a
state constitution is neither the charter nor the sole charter of a convention
when one is assembled. The controlling element is the popular approval of the
legislative proposal. The legislative proposal becomes controlling upon its
approval by popular vote. In State ex rel. M'Cready v. Hunt,26 the court said:
23. Goodrich v. Moore, 2 Minn. 61 (1858).
24. 151 Mich. 337, 347, 115 N. W. 429, 433 (1908).
25. N. Y. CoNsT. Art 19, § 2.
26. 2 Hill's Law 1, 223 (S. C. 1834).
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"It is true, the legislature cannot limit the convention; but if the people elect them
for the purpose of doing a specific act or duty pointed out by the act of the legislature,
the act would define their powers. For the people elect in reference to that and nothing
else."
As to the effect of popular approval of a legislative proposal, see also In re
Opinion to the Governor.
27
Reference was previously made to the recent experience of the State of
New Jersey in revising its constitution although excluding certain provisions
thereof from alteration. This was done in a state whose constitution had no
provisions as to constitutional conventions. The brief provision in the Ten-
nessee constitution with respect to such conventions makes it possible to
employ the method which proved successful in New Jersey, except that in the
State of Tennessee the delegates to a convention cannot be chosen until after
the question of calling a convention has been submitted and approved.28 Aside
from this point, the issue in the State of Tennessee is one of policy rather
than of law.
27. 55 R. I. 56, 178 Atl. 433 (1935).
28. Derryberry v. State Board of Election Com'rs, 150 Tenn. 525, 266 S. W. 102
(1924).
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